A key intuition of standard rational expectations models is that private information about future payoffs can by itself not generate trading. Trading is only possible if there is an additional motive for trading such as for example liquidity trading.
I Introduction
Any rational expectations equilibrium where investors trade based on private information must satisfy two conditions:
1. Equilibrium prices do not reveal all information.
Equilibrium portfolio holdings are state dependent for informed investors.
The first condition is obvious: if equilibrium prices reveal all private information then it is not possible to trade based on this information. The second condition states that investors who receive private information should be able to respond to this information.
This second condition poses a challenge to any rational explanation of informed trading since informed investors can only respond to their information if someone else in the economy is willing to trade with them.
The standard way to satisfy these two conditions is to introduce a second motive for trading. For example, in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) some market participants are noise or liquidity traders. These liquidity traders satisfy the first condition of information based trading since market participants cannot disentangle price changes that are due to private information from price changes due to liquidity shocks. The liquidity traders also satisfy the second condition since all investors can expect to profit from trading against liquidity traders, hence trading becomes profitable even for uninformed investors. Wang (1994) some investors have access to a private production technology whose output is correlated to the dividend of a traded risky asset.
A key intuition of the standard rational expectations approach is that private information about future payoffs can by itself not generate trading. Trading is only possible if there is an additional motive for trading, something beyond private payoff information.
In this paper I show that this intuition is wrong. I show that the misleading intuition of the standard REE models results from an assumption that all of these models have in common: investors have negative exponential (CARA) utility functions. I develop a model where all investors are rational, enter the world with common priors, and where uninformed investors are willing to trade with informed investors despite the fact that they know that they trade with someone who possess superior information.
In order to understand the intuition of the model consider the following example.
Suppose there is a single risky asset that pays an uncertain terminal future dividend.
The probability distribution of the dividend depends on two uncertain parameters: the mean µ and the standard deviation σ. Assume for now the economy consists of investors who observe the realization of µ and σ. Then for any given (µ, σ) combination we can calculate the equilibrium price P . On the other hand, for any fixed equilibrium price P we can calculate all possible (µ, σ) pairs that will lead to this particular price. If the price P increases in µ and decreases in σ then the set of all possible (µ, σ) pairs that are consistent with P is an upward sloping curve in the µ -σ diagram (see Figure 1 ).
Suppose now there are some uninformed investors who do not know the realization of µ and σ. Then the price P reveals to these investors the subset of (µ, σ) pairs that lie on the Consider now the second scenario where all investors have negative exponential (CARA) utility functions. Suppose investors differ in their risk aversion. For example, suppose within each information group -informed and uninformed -one half of the investors have a coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 1 and the other half have a coefficient of 2. Then these utility functions will rule out trade for a similar reason as in the previous paragraph: for CARA utility, the investors with risk aversion 1 would like to hold twice as many shares as the investors with risk-aversion 2 independent of the payoff distribution.
Hence all investors know their equilibrium demands even before they observe any payoff information. Therefore trade is not possible and private information is useless for the informed investors.
In Section III.1 I show that this no-trade result holds whenever the marginal utility of some investors is a scaled version of the marginal utility of other investors. This scaling property holds for any set of quadratic utility functions and any set of CARA utility functions (including linear utility as a special case of CARA). Therefore new information cannot generate trading if investor's preferences belong to these special class of utility functions.
The scaling property of utility functions is a very specific assumption. The no-trade result for this class of utility functions does not hold for more general utility functions. In this paper I demonstrate how investors with power utility trade as some investors receive private information about the uncertain distribution parameters. For tractability I restrict the analysis to a world with two time periods. The term "trading" refers to differences of equilibrium portfolio holdings across different (µ, σ) states. This power utility example provides three main results.
The first result is that an increase in the risk parameter σ, holding the mean µ constant, causes low risk aversion informed investors to sell shares to high risk aversion informed investors. In order to understand this counterintuitive result consider the example of a highly levered hedge fund. If the assets of this hedge fund become riskier, the fund faces a higher probability of bankruptcy and might therefore rationally reduce his risk exposure.
This argument applies in a similar fashion to the power utility investors of this model.
The individuals with low risk aversion invest a larger portion of their wealth into the risky asset than the individuals with high risk aversion. The low risk aversion investors have therefore more to lose in the bad states of the world. Since marginal utility tends to infinity as wealth tends to zero, low risk aversion investors avoid these bad outcomes by reducing their risky positions as risk increases.
The second result is that uninformed investors are willing to trade with informed investors despite the fact that the uninformed know that they are trading with someone who possesses superior information. Ideally a particular uninformed investor would like to mimic the behavior of an informed investor who has identical preferences. However, the uninformed only observe the aggregate informed demand. For example, if informed investors sell on aggregate then the uninformed investors do not know whether this selling comes from low risk-aversion or high-risk aversion informed investors. As a result uninformed investors sometimes trade with investors who are identical except for their private information. In this case the uninformed investors lose from trading. In the equilibrium the profits from trading with informed investors with different preferences exceed the losses from trading with identical investors.
The third result is that investors are willing to pay for information. The dollar amount that investors are willing to spend on information has a U-shaped form across the risk-aversion coefficient. Investors with very low or very high risk aversion profit more from trading than investors with average risk aversion. Therefore investors whose preferences are close to the average investor in the economy are willing to pay the lowest amount for information. The incentive to collect information is not driven by exogenously specified noise shocks, but instead by the difference in the preferences. As explained above, this result is not possible for CARA utility and is therefore a major deviation from the standard rational expectations literature. Since the seller of the asset does not know this optimal behavior the asset is worth more for the buyer than for the seller. This paper has two main parts. In the first part of the paper (Section II) I characterize an equilibrium with uncertainty about µ and σ for a general class of utility functions. In the second part of the paper (Section III) I demonstrate the general result of the first part for the case of power utility.
II The Model

II.1 Assumptions
There are two time periods, "today" and "tomorrow". The market consists of two assets, a single risky asset and a risk free asset. Investors can trade these assets today and they will receive final payoffs tomorrow. The equilibrium price of the risky asset is given by P . The risk-free asset is in zero net supply. Each investor chooses his demand X for the risky asset in order to maximize expected utility of final wealth
where x 0 is the initial endowment with the risky asset, D is the final dividend of the risky asset, and F is the information of the investor at the time he makes his decision. To simplify the notation I have set the risk-free rate to zero. Nature chooses the dividend D in two steps: first nature chooses a parameter µ and a parameter σ. These two parameters determine a conditional distribution func-
According to the probability law F nature chooses then in the second step the realization of the dividend D. I assume that changes in µ and σ induce first and second degree stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution F : an increase of µ shifts F to the right, a decrease of σ spreads the distribution while preserving the mean.
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Assumption 1 (Stochastic dominance shifts). .
If µ
Assumption 1 implies that all risk averse investors prefer distributions with high µ over distributions with low µ and distributions with low σ over distributions with high σ.
However, the fact that investors prefer upward shifts of µ and downward shifts of σ does not imply that investors respond to these shifts by increasing their demand for the risky asset. In order to relate changes in the demand to changes of F I make the following assumptions about utility functions:
x < 2 for all x.
As Fishburn and Porter (1976) and Kira and Ziemba (1980) have shown, the first and second part of Assumption 2 imply that investors will increase their demand X as a 2 First degree stochastic dominance (FSD) is defined as F 1
, where c * (µ 1 ) = inf{x : F 1 (x) = 1}. Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) is defined as
response to a first order stochastic dominance shift of D:
The first and third part of Assumption 2 imply that investors will increase their demand as a response to a second order stochastic dominance shift of D:
An example for a utility function that satisfies Assumption 2 is positive power utility:
There is a continuum of investors. Investors are divided in two dimensions. First, investors are separated into two groups according to their preferences. For example, investors could have power utility with two different parameters γ. Second, investors are separated with respect to their information. Within each of the two preference categories, some investors are informed and some are uninformed. The informed investors know µ, σ and the price P when they choose their demand X. Then uninformed investors only know P when they make their investment decision. For simplicity I assume that these four investor groups have identical population weights.
In addition to the economically motivated assumptions above I also make the following technical assumption about the distribution of the dividend:
Assumption 3 (Distribution of final payoff). .
1.
µ is a continuous random variable with realizations in (0, ∞). σ is a discrete random variable with finitely many possible realizations in Σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n }, where
3. For any fixed x > 0 we have: lim µ→0 F (x; µ, σ) = 1 and lim µ→∞ F (x; µ, σ) = 0.
4. Let F be the set of all distribution functions F that are associated with some (µ, σ)
be the set of all continuous real functions with |c(x)| < M for x > 0. Then f is continuous in the following sense:
for every M > 0 and > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that whenever
The continuity of the parameter µ in part 1 of assumption 3 will be necessary in order to apply fixed point arguments. I assume that σ takes on finitely may values for simplicity.
By part 2 the dividend D is positive and bounded for any fixed µ. By part 3 the dividend is small for small values of µ and large for large values of µ. Part 4 ensures that small changes of µ result in small changes of the distribution function F .
II.2 The Equilibrium
The payoff distribution depends on the uncertain parameters µ and σ. The informed investors observe the realization of these parameters. In a rational expectations equilibrium the uninformed investors infer information about µ and σ from the equilibrium price. Let F be an arbitrary probability distribution for the dividend D. LetF I =F (µ, σ) be the distribution function conditional on observing µ and σ, and letF U =F (P ) be the distribution conditional on observing the equilibrium price P . I will refer to the demand of preference group i with informationF as X i (F , P ). Sometimes I will write X Ii = X(F I , P )
for the informed demand and X U i = X(F U , P ) for the uninformed demand.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is given by a price function P (µ, σ), and demand functions X Ii , X U i , i = 1, 2 such that 1. (utility maximization)
(rational expectations)F
where the right-hand side is the total endowment of the risky asset.
Note that (1) defines the demands X as a function of the price for a fixed arbitrary distribution functionF . In the equilibrium this distribution function depends on the equilibrium price P for the uninformed investors. In order to find an equilibrium I start by characterizing properties of the demand functions:
Lemma 1 (Demand functions). The demand functions have the following properties:
1. The informed demand X I = X(F (µ, σ), P ) is continuous in P and µ. X I strictly increases with µ and strictly decreases with σ and P .
2. SupposeF is the distribution function conditional on the information that nature chooses a particular (µ, σ) pair randomly out of some finite set {(µ 1 , σ 1 ), . . . , (µ m , σ m )} with probabilities π 1 , . . . , π m . Then X(F , P ) is is continuous in P and continuous and strictly increasing in µ i , i = 1, . . . , n.
3. lim µ→∞ X I = ∞ and lim µ→0 X I = −∞ for any given P > 0.
4. lim P →∞ X I = −∞ and lim P →0 X I = ∞ for any given P > 0.
Proof. Part 3 of the lemma follows from Assumption 3 part 3. Part 4 follows from Assumption 3 part 2. For the continuity I will only show that X I is continuous in µ.
g is continuous and concave in X. Let X * 1 = argmax g(X; µ 1 , σ). Fix > 0. Choose
Lemma 1 implies that in a world populated only with informed investors we can always find two (µ, σ) pairs that generate the same equilibrium price. But in this case the price does not reveal the (µ, σ) state, hence it is not possible that all investors are fully informed in the equilibrium.
Theorem 1.
There exists no equilibrium that reveals the realized (µ, σ) state to the uninformed investors.
Proof. Suppose there exists a fully revealing equilibrium. Then all investors know the realization of µ and σ. Let X = i (X Ii + X U i ) be the aggregate demand. Then X has the same properties as the informed demand X I in lemma 1. Suppose nature chooses (µ 1 , σ 1 ). Then it follows from lemma 1 that there exists a unique price P (µ 1 , σ 1 ) that clears the market. Now suppose nature chooses σ 2 . Then lemma 1 implies that there exists a unique µ 2 such that P (µ 2 , σ 2 ) = P (µ 1 , σ 1 ). But then the uninformed investors cannot distinguish between (µ 1 , σ 1 ) and (µ 2 , σ 2 ).
Lemma 1 implies that the equilibrium price increases with µ and decreases with σ.
Recall from Assumption 3 that the variable σ takes on the values σ 1 < · · · < σ n . As a result there are exactly n increasing (µ, σ) states consistent with any given equilibrium price P .
Theorem 2.
If an equilibrium exists then it must have the following property: For every
Step 1: Fix P > 0. Suppose nature chooses (µ 1 , σ 1 ). Let the aggregate informed demand be given by X I (µ 1 , σ 1 , P ). Then it follows from Lemma 1 that for each σ 2 . . . σ n there exist unique µ 2 < · · · < µ n such that X I (µ 1 , σ 1 , P ) = X I (µ 2 , σ 2 , P ) = · · · = X I (µ n , σ n , P ). Since X I (µ, σ, P ) is a continuous increasing function of µ, each µ i in {µ 2 , . . . , µ n } is a continuous increasing function of µ 1 .
Step 2: Suppose the uninformed investors believe that nature has chosen a (µ, σ) σ 1 ) , . . . , (µ n , σ n )}. Let X U (F , P ) be the aggregate uninformed demand. Each µ i in {µ 2 , . . . , µ n } is a continuous increasing function of µ 1 (by step 1) and X U (F , P ) is a continuous increasing function of each µ i ∈F . Therefore for each fixed P the aggregate demand X = X I (µ 1 , σ 1 , P ) + X U (F , P ) is a continuous increasing function of µ 1 and we have lim µ 1 →∞ X = ∞ and lim µ 1 →0 X = −∞.
Step 3: By step 1 there exists for each P and each µ 1 a collectionF of (µ, σ) distributions such that X I (µ 1 , σ 1 , P ) = · · · = X I (µ n , σ n , P ) for each (µ i , σ i ) inF . By step 2 we can choose µ 1 so that the market clears for each (µ i , σ i ) ∈F if the uninformed investors believe that the true state is inF . Since the market clears at P andF , the uninformed investors know the realization of the informed demand X I . Since the uninformed investors know the functional form of X I , and since X I (µ 1 , σ, P ) = X I (µ 2 , σ, P ) for µ 1 = µ 2 , the price P revealsF (P ) = {(µ 1 , σ 1 ), . . . , (µ n , σ n )} to the uninformed investors.
Theorem 2 confirms that each equilibrium price is consistent with an upward sloping curve in the µ -σ diagram in Figure 1 . The theorem shows that for each price P there exists a (µ, σ) state that clears the market. In order to show that an equilibrium exists we have to show that there exists a market clearing price P for each possible (µ, σ) state.
In order to prove this result we need the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Informed versus uninformed demand). Consider a collection of (µ, σ) distri- σ 1 , P ) , . . . , X(µ n , σ n , P )}, σ 1 , P ) , . . . , X(µ n , σ n , P )}.
Then for any P > 0:
Proof.
Taking the first order conditions:
for i = 1, . . . , n. Assume an uninformed investor associates probability π i with state
Hence X ≤ X(F , P ). The second inequality follows accordingly.
Theorem 3.
There exists an equilibrium.
The proof uses the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Fix (µ 1 , σ 1 ). Then for each P > 0 there exists a unique set {(µ 2 , σ 2 ), . . . , (µ n , σ n )} such that X I (µ 1 , σ 1 , P ) = X I (µ 2 , σ 2 , P ) = · · · = X I (µ n , σ n , P ). Since each X I (µ i , σ i , P ) is continuous in µ i and in P , each µ i ∈ {(µ 2 , σ 2 ), . . . , (µ n , σ n )} is a continuous function of P . σ 1 ) , . . . , (µ n , σ n )}. Since X U (F (P ), P ) is continuous in P and in each µ i ∈F (P ), the aggregate demand X(P ) = X I (µ 1 , σ 1 , P ) + X U (F (P ), P ) is a continuous function of P . By Lemma 1 we have lim P →0 X I = ∞ and lim P →∞ X I = −∞. Hence by Lemma 2 we have lim P →0 X U = ∞ and lim P →∞ X U = −∞. Hence for (µ 1 , σ 1 ) there exists a market clearing price P . Since P revealsF (P ) to the uninformed investors, P is an equilibrium price.
By Theorem 2 each equilibrium price P is consistent with n different (µ, σ) states.
Since the uninformed investors cannot distinguish between these states, the uninformed demands X U i are constant across these n states. Hence market clearing implies that the aggregate informed demand i X Ii must also be constant between these states. For a given price, portfolio reallocation across states can therefore only occur within the group of informed investors. The following lemma illustrates how this reallocation depends on the µ -σ trade-offs of the informed investors.
Lemma 3 (Heterogenous µ -σ trade-offs). Suppose P is an equilibrium price for (µ *
and (µ * 2 , σ 2 ) and suppose there exists a µ 2 such that
and
In Lemma 3, as σ increases from σ 1 to σ 2 , investors 2 requires a higher increase in µ than investor 1 in order to remain indifferent between the two (µ, σ) states. As a result investor 1 "buys" shares from investor 2 as the world "moves" from state (µ 1 , σ 1 ) to state (µ 2 , σ 2 ). The aggregate demand of the two informed investors remains constant since the uninformed investors cannot distinguish between the two states.
Lemma 3 illustrates how investors trade if their individual trade-offs between µ and
σ differ. The differences between these trade-offs depends on the differences between the utility functions of the investors. The following section demonstrates how these differences affect trading for various standard utility functions.
III Examples
III.1 Scaling Utility Functions
Suppose there are two informed investors with initial wealth w 1 = x 01 P and w 2 = x 02 P .
Suppose the utility function of the first investors is given by U 1 (x). The following lemma shows that it is always possible to find a second utility function U 2 (x) such that there will be no portfolio rebalancing across states.
Lemma 4 (State independent portfolio allocation). Suppose there are two identically informed investors with utility functions U 1 (x) and U 2 (x) and initial wealth w 1 and w 2 . If
independent of the distribution function F .
Proof. Plugging (2) in the first order condition of the second investors we get
The utility function U 2 is a scaled version of U 1 , adjusted for the wealths w 1 and w 2 .
The intuitive meaning of equation (2) can be easily seen for the case w 1 = w 2 = 0: for this case U 2 is simply a stretched version of U 1 . Since the scaling factor α in lemma 4
is independent of the distribution function F , any two investors whose utility functions satisfy condition (2) will not reallocate their portfolios across states. Since informed investors do not trade there is also no reason for uninformed investors to trade.
Corollary 1.
Suppose the utility functions of the investors in the model of Section II satisfy Lemma 4. Then the informed equilibrium demands X i (F (µ, σ), P ) and the uninformed demands X i (F (P ), P ) are independent of the state of the world (µ, σ).
Even though Lemma 4 seems to be a special case, the following result shows that this scaling property holds for two well known utility functions.
Lemma 5 (Portfolio allocation for CARA and quadratic utility). The property of Lemma (4) holds for any two negative exponential utility functions U i (x) = −e −a i x and any two quadratic utility functions
Proof. To see this result for the exponential case suppose U i (x) = −e −a i x for i = 1, 2.
Then we have
where α = 
Hence if all investors have quadratic utility or all investors have negative exponential utility there will be no trading and there is no advantage to being informed. This result applies to the vast majority of heterogenous information models who employ either CARA utility as for example Grossman and Stiglitz (1982) . One of the fundamental economic implications of these models is that if some investors trade on private information then these or other investors must also have a second motive for trading, such as liquidity or hedging trades. As Lemma 4 and 5 show this implication is due to the specific utility functions of these models. The following section shows an example of an economy with power utility investors who trade based on their information even though they have no alternative motive for trading.
III.2 Power Utility
III.2.1 A Preliminary Example
In this section I will demonstrate with a numerical example how power utility investors rebalance across states. Consider first the following simple example: the economy is populated by a single investor with utility U (x) = x 0.5 . The dividend D of the asset can either be $80 or $125, with a probability of 1/2. The investor knows this distribution.
The first order condition is given by
where
where x 0 is the initial endowment, X is the demand and P is the price. Suppose the investors is endowed with one share of the risky asset. Setting the demand X equal to the supply of x 0 = 1 and solving the first order condition for P gives an equilibrium price of $100. Assume now there are two investors with utility function U 1 (x) = x 0.5 and U 2 (x) = x 0.8 .
Then we have the following result: The equilibrium price for both distributions is given by P = $101.058. This example illustrates two results. First, investors rebalance across states but trading volume is low. Second, as risk increases the investor with the lower risk-aversion sells shares to the investor with the higher risk aversion. In order to understand these results we can take a look at the marginal utilities f (D). investor. Therefore, in the bad state of the world, his wealth is closer to zero than the wealth of the more risk avers investor. Since his marginal utility tends to infinity for low wealth states, the low risk aversion investor has a stronger incentive to reduce his exposure to the risky asset than the investors with high risk aversion.
III.2.2 A Power Utility Example of the Equilibrium in Section II
This In order to preserve the intuitive meaning of µ as a "good" state variable and σ as a "bad" state variable and in order to avoid negative dividends I will now assume that the dividend D is distributed according to a combination of truncated normal distributions.
For given µ and given σ the dividend D is given by
where µ, σ and Z are drawn from independent truncated normal distributions. For the distribution parameters and truncation quantiles see Table 1 . These values are chosen so that µ, σ and D are strictly positive.
In order to demonstrate the effect of relative risk aversion on equilibrium demands I assume that there are four investor classes with utility functions given by U (x) = x γ , γ ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. All investor groups are initially endowed with one share of the risky asset. In order to explain how investors trade I will solve for the equilibrium in several steps. For the first step assume all investors are informed. Recall that investors maximize expected utility of their final wealth which is given by
where x 0 = 1 is the initial endowment. Since there are four investor groups in this economy, the aggregate supply of the risky asset consists of four shares. The equilibrium price P therefore solves
Since the optimal demand functions X i (P ) are not linear in P it is not possible to solve this equation analytically. However, since the X i strictly decrease with the price P (see Hence investors with low risk aversion hold more shares of the risky asset than investors with high risk aversion. We would like to know how the equilibrium demands X change as we change µ and σ. Equation (4) shows that these changes affect X in two ways: first, the (µ, σ) state affects X directly through the distribution of the dividend D. Second, the (µ, σ) state affects X indirectly, since a change of µ and σ will generally change the price P and therefore change the initial wealth x 0 P .
In order separate these two effects I first demonstrate the equilibrium, holding the initial wealth constant at x 0 P = $98.26. Table 2 shows the outcomes for various (µ, σ)
states. There are two main results. First, a change of µ only affects the equilibrium price P , but not the equilibrium demands X. This result is obvious from the wealth equation (4) . Since an increase of µ simply shifts the distribution of D to the right, the final wealth W 1 does not change with µ as long as P adjusts by exactly the same amount as µ. Hence the original demands remain optimal.
The second result is that the informed investors with the lowest risk aversion (γ = 0.8)
reduce their holdings of the risky asset as the standard deviation σ increases. All other informed investors increase their holdings with σ. The reason for this behavior is that the highly levered low risk-aversion investors have the most to loose as the risk of the asset increases, as explained in Section III.2.1.
In Table 2 all investors have an artificially restricted initial wealth of $98.26. However, the outcomes of the table show that the true initial wealth x 0 P increases with µ and decreases with σ. Since for any given (µ, σ) state the demand X is an increasing function of initial wealth, the wealth effect amplifies the effect of µ and σ on the price. Table 3 shows this result. The difference between table 2 and 3 is the pure wealth effect. The absolute price changes relative to P = 98.26 are always greater in Table 3 than in Table   2 . Table 3 also shows that low risk aversion investors increase their demand X more aggressively with their initial wealth than high risk aversion investors. As a result low aversion investors buy shares from high risk aversion investors as µ increases. This trading is a pure result of the wealth effect. In this way Table 2 Now that we understand the demand of the informed investors we are ready to add uninformed investors to the model. In order to show how uninformed investors influence the equilibrium I will introduce uninformed demand in two steps. In the first step I solve for the demand of hypothetical uninformed investors who are not part of the market clearing process and therefore take the prices of the informed economy of Table 3 as given.
Note that the uninformed investors only observe the equilibrium price P , but not µ or σ directly. The uninformed demand depends therefore on the distribution of all possible (µ, σ) states for any given equilibrium price P . Table 4 shows several (µ, σ)
states consistent with various various prices P . The informed demands are given by X I , and the hypothetical uninformed demands are given by X U . If two (µ, σ) states have the same price then the uninformed demand is identical for both states. The table
shows how the uninformed investors try to mimic the behavior of the informed investors with corresponding risk aversion. For example, as the price increases from 80 to 100 the uninformed investors know that this price increase is due either to an increase of µ or to a decrease of of σ. Recall from the previous two tables that both possible cases increase the low risk aversion informed demand and decrease the high risk aversion informed demand.
As a result, the optimal strategy for the uninformed investors is to increase their demand with the price if they have low risk aversion and to decrease their demand with the price if they have high risk aversion. However, for the low risk aversion uninformed investors the indifference standard deviationσ increases from 35 at P = 120 to 45 at P = 80. The reason for this sharp increase is a combination of the wealth effect and the uncertainty about the dividend risk σ. For all prices, the investors face the possibility of a high risk state σ. However, a decreasing price also decreases wealth. Therefore the low risk aversion uninformed investors face the risk of bankruptcy as the price decreases. In order to avoid bankruptcy these investors sharply reduce their demand with the price. This reduction leads to a decrease of the aggregate uninformed demand as the price decreases.
Finally, Table 5 shows the equilibrium where informed and uninformed investors demands all aggregate to the total supply. The effect that the uninformed investors have on the price slightly reduces their trading, but the overall results are similar to the previous table. Uninformed investors as a group sell shares to informed investors as the price decreases. In this way Table 5 demonstrates how uninformed investors are willing to trade with better informed investors despite the fact that they know they are in an informational disadvantage.
In this economy investors are willing to pay for information since informed investors are better able to allocate their portfolios. Let c i be the maximum dollar amount that an investor with utility function U i = x γ i would agree to pay before he observes any private information or the equilibrium price. The information cost c i equates the ex-ante utility of the informed investors with the ex-ante utility of the uninformed investors in the following way:
where X Ii (µ, σ, P ) is the optimal informed demand and X U i (P ) is the optimal uninformed demand for investor i. The first row of Table 6 shows the cost c for the equilibrium with four preference classes. Investors with the lowest risk aversion (highest γ) are willing to pay the highest cost c, however the information cost is not monotone in γ for the following reason. First, low risk aversion investors (high γ) trade more and are therefore willing to pay a higher cost c. Second, as we increase γ starting at γ = 0.2, we move closer to the average investor in the economy. Since the equilibrium price reflects the preferences of the average investor, investors close to the average are not willing to pay much to become informed. Both effects together create the shape of c as a function of γ in Table 6 . The second row of the table shows that the information cost depends on γ in a similar way for an equilibrium with a finer partition of preferences.
IV Conclusion
Standard rational expectations models require some form of noise in order to enable 
578, X 2 = 1.422. and P = 100. Table 4 : Equilibrium with Informed Investors and Hypothetical Uninformed Demand. This table shows (µ, σ) combinations consistent with various prices P for an equilibrium with only informed investors who have have an initial endowment of 1 share. Informed demands are given by X I and prices are given by P . X U are the demands of hypothetical uninformed investors who are not part of the market clearing process.σ is the standard deviation for which the informed demand is identical to the corresponding uninformed demand. Utility functions are given by U (x) = x γ . The distribution of the dividend D is given by Table 1 . Informed demands are given by X I , uninformed demands are given by X U and prices are given by P .σ is the standard deviation for which the informed demand is identical to the corresponding uninformed demand. Utility functions are given by U (x) = x γ . The distribution of the dividend D is given by Table 1 . Table 5 . The second row shows the costs for an equilibrium with seven preference classes. Utility functions are given by U (x) = x γ . The initial wealth of each investor is given by 1 share of the risky asset. The distribution of the dividend D is given by Table 1 . 
